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The modus ponens can be interpreted as an answer to a circularity charge, but this strategy is 
only feasible if the additional conditional premise is interpreted as a claim to a material 
implication. Here’s how it works. Suppose one argues that a premise A implies a conclusion 
B. This argument is arbitrary, so I press the arguer for further justification. In response, the 
arguer adds the premise ‘A implies B’ and makes some qualifications. The result of this new-
found premise is the following argument: P1. A implies B; P2. A is true; therefore, C. B is 
true. Now, this won’t solve the circularity worries because we are not obliged to accept C on 
the basis of P1 and P2 unless we first concede the conditional (S) if P1 and P2 are true, C 
must be true . So we must add S as an additional premise in order to accept the implication. 1
But this won’t get us far because we are not obliged to accept C due to P1, P2 and S unless 
we concede that (T) if P1 and P2 and S are true, C must be true. But once (T) is added I can 
demand a further justification, and so and so forth.  
The modus ponens can be interpreted as a failed attempt to avoid a circularity accusation. 
It is the result of adding a conditional premise to justify an earlier inference, but this brings 
additional charges of circularity, which lead to more conditional premises. The conditional 
premises work like fraudulent promissory notes: their truth ensure the validity of the earlier 
implication statement, but in order to ascertain their truth you need to accept their truth in 
advance. It is a strategy that is bound to fail because each conditional premise begs the 
question. It seems that the conditional premise is just a different way of reinstating the initial 
implication allegation. It doesn’t bring new information to the table, but repeats what was 
said before in different words.    
We need to look carefully at the first modus ponens, since it contains some quirks that 
need to be addressed before we can stop this regress. First, in order to avoid the circularity, 
accusation the arguer was compelled to assert the truth of the second premise. This is weird, 
because I can accept that A implies B even if A is false. The other weird aspect of the initial 
modus ponens is that this will only work if the first premise is a strict implication, but this 
means that the premise will be false if A and B are not conceptually connected, and most 
conditional sentences that are presented as a premise of a modus ponens argument are not like 
that. Finally, the revised argument remains circular since there are no reasons to accept that A 
implies B other than the premise that asserts that A strictly implies B.  
Perhaps if we interpret the premise as a material implication we might provide a solution 
for this circularity problem. The statement that A implies B should be interpreted as ‘it is not 
the case that A is true and B is false in a given parameter world’. This reference to a 
parameter world is justified by the fact that when we evaluate arguments we consider all the 
possible worlds in which the premises are true. The set of these possible worlds might include 
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the actual world, but it doesn’t need to be restricted by it. The premises and the conclusion 
need to be evaluated in the same parameter worlds, otherwise I could select a world where 
the conclusion is false and compare it with another world where the premises are true. Thus, 
we have:  
P1*. It is not the case that A is true and B is false in the parameter world. 
P2*. A is true in the parameter world. 
Ergo, 
C*. B is true in the parameter world.  
This reformulation not only seems to correct all the flaws of the initial reconstruction, as it 
puts an end to the justification regress. P1* is not a strict implication anymore and the arguer 
doesn’t need to accept that P2* is true in order for the implication to hold, but only that when 
P1* and P2* are both true, C* is also true. The premises strictly imply the conclusion, as they 
should. More importantly, it is not circular or arbitrary to think that the premises necessitate 
the conclusion, since this is self-evident. If we have a certain states of things that ensure the 
truth of P1* and a consistency in truth values attribution, C* will be true in all the P1*&P2*-
worlds.  
The conditional that results from the conjunction of premises as an antecedent and the 
conclusion as a consequent is also self-evident: ‘If it is not the case that A is true and B is 
false in the parameter world, and A is true in the parameter world, then B is true in the 
parameter world’. This puts a firm halt to the justification regress. The material implication is 
a claim to a relation of implication inside a parameter world. The strict implication is a claim 
to an unrestricted relation of implication that takes all the parameter worlds where the 
material implication occurs. The claim to a strict implication is not circular since it can be 
independently assessed and verified by the truth values of the material implication and its 
possible combinations with other premises and conclusion.  
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